Issue for June 19, 2026

This story follows preparations for the EXPO 2027 specialized exhibition in Belgrade: the budget, Surcin construction sites, the national stadium, infrastructure, and decisions that affect city services, schools, and residents' daily life.

• On June 22, 2026, CINS published an investigation into EXPO 2027 contractors and suppliers in Surcin: the outlet did not obtain a full official list, but confirmed more than 200 firms through documents, interviews, and databases, including companies with criminal, political, or pro-government links.
• CINS examples include Makis beton, PZP Valjevo, NM Kop, C&LC Kameni agregati, CAP 1 ALCZ, and Betonjerka Cacak; Danas republished the investigation the same day in its economy section.
• On June 19, 2026, Danas reported that Vojvodina school calendars for 2026/27, like the Education Ministry calendars, require schools to plan one-day student visits to EXPO between May 17 and June 25, 2027.
• After criticism, the Education Ministry said organized EXPO visits are not mandatory school activities and can happen only by each school's decision and with parent or legal-guardian consent.
• The EXPO story is not only a construction and budget project: decisions around the exhibition are already entering school planning, the public dispute over voluntary participation, and questions about public-spending transparency.

NIS is Serbia's key oil company and the operator of the Pancevo refinery. This story follows how sanctions against the Russian stake in the company affect fuel supplies, Serbia's talks with MOL, Gazprom Neft, and the United States, and control over strategic infrastructure.

• On June 11, 2026, minister Dubravka Djedovic Handanovic said Serbia and MOL had agreed on the shareholder framework around NIS.
• The next step is an agreement between Gazprom Neft and MOL, followed by approval from the US administration.
• Before the current OFAC license expired on June 16, 2026, NIS requested a new special license.
• If Gazprom Neft sells 56.15 percent of NIS to MOL and OFAC approves the transaction, Serbia is supposed to buy another five percent of the shares.
• With that extra five percent, Serbia's stake would rise to roughly 35 percent, while MOL would remain the controlling owner with 51.15 percent.
• According to the minister, the Hungarian side has undertaken to keep the Pancevo refinery running at least around the average annual level of the four years before sanctions.
• By evening, N1 and Danas added expert framing: without changing NIS's statute, the extra five percent does not give Serbia new control, and the question remains dependent on Gazprom Neft, MOL, and OFAC.
• On June 12, Forbes/N1 added a check on an alternative Serbian buyer: Ranko Mimovic's company, tied to Reuters' report of a EUR 2 billion offer for NIS, had six account blocks over tax rulings in half a year and received a first court dispute for RSD 98,496.
• On June 13, 021/RTS carried Jelica Putnikovic's assessment: the next key fork is Tuesday, June 16, when existing NIS licenses expire, while the outcome depends on OFAC, concrete contracts, and guarantees for the Pancevo refinery.
• On June 16, the Energy Ministry and MOL signed a shareholder agreement: it takes effect only if MOL reaches a deal with Gazprom Neft to buy 56.15 percent of NIS and OFAC approves the transaction.
• Under the agreement Serbia is to buy an additional five percent of the shares, the Pancevo refinery should operate for at least 10 years at capacity comparable to the four years before US sanctions, and Petrohemija should avoid disruption.
• Aleksandar Vucic said from Tbilisi that, based on information he was receiving from Washington, NIS's operating license may be extended for another 15 days, but this had not been officially confirmed at the moment of his statement.
• On June 19, Dubravka Djedovic Handanovic said the Serbian side had completed its part of the talks with MOL, and that the next practical step is a Gazprom Neft-MOL agreement acceptable to OFAC.

This story follows the Belgrade metro project: the first-line route, construction deadlines, exhibition and preparatory sites, and the roles of JP Beogradski metro i voz, Alstom, and city/republic authorities. For readers, it is a practical city story about how a promised transport project affects neighborhoods, budgets, and future mobility.

• On June 19, 2026, Nikola Nikodijevic told N1 that the exact date for fully closing Bulevar despota Stefana is still unknown because EPS cables and Interior Ministry infrastructure must be moved.
• According to Nikodijevic, once the metro boring machines start work, traffic from Cvijiceva to Pancevacki most will be fully closed for about seven months, and the city will announce alternative routes in advance.
• On June 14, 2026, N1 reported that a "Beogradski metro i voz" exhibition space is being prepared under the Slavija square plateau, but the company did not explain the space's purpose or opening date.
• The entrance to the premises has already been covered with metro drawings, although, in N1's wording, tunnel digging has not yet begun.
• Milos Vuckovic of Kreni-promeni called the exhibition space a "Potemkin village" and tied it to pre-election use of large infrastructure promises.
• Critics from the Po meri metro initiative continue to point to the disputed first-line route: through Belgrade Waterfront, not through Prokop and the Clinical Center of Serbia.
• The project remains an important Belgrade transport story because official deadlines, the real start of tunnel works, and the metro's connection with existing rail/medical hubs remain publicly contested.